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However, since the rule applies also to criminal cases," it is
believed that should a subsequent decision overrule the first opinion
in a criminal case, the court should refuse to apply the law of the case
when such application would exact an unjust penalty. Equitabe con-
siderations should be paramount in any application of the law of the
case doctrine. JoHN L. YouNG
SOME CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE KENTUCKY MUNICI-
PAL HOUSING COMMISSION ACT.
Housing legislation in the United States probably had its birth in
the state of New York, where the first of a series of Tenement House
Laws was passed in 1867,1 providing that it was illegal to build a tene-
ment house covering one hundred per cent of a lot, that a ten-foot yard
had to be left at the rear for light and air, and that a wholly subter-
ranean room could not be rented for human habitation. Kentucky
passed its first Housing Law in 1910,2 the act being limited to cities of
the first class, that is, Louisville. The law had merely to do with limit-
ing the specifications of houses with relation to the size of the lots
they occupied, with certain provisions as to light, ventilation, and fire-
prevention. In 1920, the Kentucky Housing Act' was passed. This act
still applied only to cities of the first class, and did not effect any
appreciable change in the existing law. This act was repealed in
1922. 4
The National Industrial Recovery Act of 19335 laid the foundation
for the present housing law in Kentucky. This act provided for certain
grants of funds to states which would enact laws providing for low-cost
housing projects. Passed in order to take advantage of the grants
offered by the federal law, the Kentucky Municipal Housing Commis-
sion Act 6 provides that cities of the first and second class be authorized
"to acquire, establish, erect, maintain and operate low-cost housing
projects within the corporate limits of such municipality . . . for the
purpose of providing adequate and sanitary living quarters for indi-
viduals and families"; that as a matter of legislative determination
and "in order to promote and protect the health, safety, morals, and
welfare of the public, it is necessary in the public interest to confer
these powers upon the cities"; that the cities may create a Municipal
Housing Commission with the power to engage in low-cost housing and
slum clearance projects, fixing rental rates, and establishing rules and
by-laws governing the use of the premises included in the project; that
the commission may acquire the land it deems necessary for the
project, either by agreement with the owners, or by condemnation
'aWedding v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 115, 290 S. W. 1059 (1927).
'New York Laws 1867, c. 908.
2 Kentucky Acts 1910, c. 41, p. 120.
3Kentucky Acts 1920, c. 68.
4 Kentucky Acts 1922, c. 123.
548 Stat. 95, 40 U.S.C.A. (Supp.) c. 8.
6 Kentucky Acts 1934, c. 113.
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proceedings brought under the provisions of Sec. 2852, Carroll's Ken-
tucky Statutes.
With the creation of this new housing commission, came a new
field of governmental service and administration. Of necessity, the
creation of any new field of governmental service gives rise to new
problems, which increase in their complexity and number as the board
or commission administering the service proceeds. It is the purpose
of this note to discuss this statute, with respect to some of the constitu-
tional questions which may be raised.
Before the validity of the commission's proceedings can be deter-
mined, it is necessary to ascertain in what way the commmission pro-
ceeds. By the terms of the statute, the first order of business of the
commission in administering the Housing Law is to determine what
is or will be a suitable situs for the proposed project. Having deter-
mined this, the commission must take the necessary steps to acquire
the land necessary for the project. This involves either a purchase
by agreement with the owner of the premises, or a purchase under
eminent domain prcoeedings authorized by the statute. It is arguable
that the exercise of this latter power by the commission sanctions the
taking of private property for private use, since the projects do not
directly benefit the general public as a whole, but are restricted to a
comparatively small group of persons who can satisfy certain require-
ments laid down by the commission It is a well established principle
In the United States that the power of eminent domain may be exer-
cised by the sovereign, but that private property may be taken only
for a public use under this power.8 The question here involved, then,
would be as to whether the low-cost housing projects authorized by the
act are In fact for a "public purpose". A recent New York case,
Xei York City Housing Aut1tority v. Muller et aL,9 involving a housing
act which is similar to the Kentucky Statute, held that the housing
projects are for a public purpose, and, therefore, that the granting of
the power of eminent domain to the Housing Authority is valid. The
Supreme Court has held, in sustaining the power to condemn, that a
use designated for the entire public, although available to only part of
the public, is for a public use.10 The Kentucky court has allowed
'Enjoyment of the facilities of housing projects are generally
limited to persons in the low income class.
IUnited States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry., 160 U. S. 668, 16 S.
Ct. 427 (1896); United States v. Certain Lands in City of Louisville
et al., 78 Fed. (2d) 648 (C. C. A. 6th) (1935); Tracy v. Elizabethtown,
L. & B. S. R. Co., 80 Ky. 259, 3 Ky. Law Rep. 813 (1882); Chesapeake
Stone Co. v. Moreland, 126 Ky. 656, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 1075 (1907) ; Goose
Creek Lumber Co. v. White, 219 Ky. 739, 294 S. W. 494 (1927); New
York Housing Authority v. Muller et al., 270 N. Y. 333, 1 N. E. (2d)
153 (1936).
'270 N. Y. 333, 1 N. E. (2d) 153 (1936).
"Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power
Co. 240 U. S. 30, 36 S. Ct. 234 (1916) (public utility may take land for
the purpose of supplying electricity to the public); Clark v. Nash, 198
U. S. 316, 25 S. Ct. 676 (1904) (allowed appropriation of property
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eminent domain in cases which would seem to be of much less public
interest than the low-cost housing projects." In view of these decisions,
it may be taken that the low-cost housing projects are for a public pur-
pose, and that the power of eminent domain exercised by the commis-
sion in condemnation proceedings is valid.
In this connection some observations may be made as to the con-
clusiveness of the commission's finding that there is a necessity for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain. Several earlier cases in Ken-
tucky are to be found which state that the court must determine
whether eminent domain is allowable." However, more recent cases
hold that the judgment of municipal authorities as to the necessity
for the taking of private property will not be disturbed unless there
is a showing that the use is palpably private, or that the claimed
necessity is without reasonable foundation.1 ' This holding represents
the general rule in the United States. 4 It would seem, therefore, that
the decision of the housing commission that certain land is necessary
for use in a project is conclusive upon all parties concerned, and that
this decision may not be questioned by the courts unless it appears
that the commission has flagrantly abused its discretion.
A statute in Kentucky" provides that condemnation proceedings
be instituted by means of a petition, and that there must be a fair trial
by jury as respects the matter of compensation. This statutory pro-
vision and the procedure described therein imports notice and hearing.
The person whose property is about to be taken can make seasonable
objections, if he has any, when the trial comes up in court.
The rate-fixing and rule-making power of the Housing Commission
presents a question of delegation of powers. The commission is given
for irrigation ditch). See also Strickley v. Highland Bay Mining Co.,
200 U. S. 527, 26 S. Ct. 301 (1905); Hairston v. Danville & Western
R. R. 208 U. S. 598, 28 Sup. Ct. 331 (1908).
u Chesapeake Stone Co. v. Moreland, 126 Ky. 656, 31 Ky. Law Rep.
1075 (1907) (eminent domain allowed for the building of a tramway);
Paine's Gdn. &c. v. Calor Oil & Gas Co., 133 Ky. 614, 103 S. W. 309 (1907)
(to build a pipe line); Rile v. L. H. & St. L. Ry. Co., 142 Ky. 67, 133
S. W. 971 (1911) (for a railroad right of way); Carter et al. v. Griffith
et al., 179 Ky. 164, 200 S. W. 369 (1918) (for building drainage ditches).
"Tracy v. E. L. & B. S. Ry. Co., 80 Ky. 259, 3 Ky. Law Rep. 813
(1882); Henderson v. City of Lexington, 132 Ky. 390, 111 S. W. 318
(1909).
" First National Bank of Paducah v. City of Paducah, 202 Ky. 48,
258 S. W. 938 (1924); Baxter v. City of Louisville, 224 Ky. 604, 6 S. W.
(2d) 1074 (1928).
"4 Fish v. Morgenthau, 10 Fed. Supp. 613 (D. C. N. H. 1935); Spaf-
ford v. Brevard County, 92 Fla. 617, 110 So. 451 (1927); Forest Preserve
District of Cook County v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. 351 Ill. 48, 183
N. E. 819 (1933); Barnes v. Peck. 283 Mass. 618, 187 N. E. 176 (1933);
Board of Hudson River Regulating District v. Fonda, J. & G. . Co.,
250 N. Y. 559, 166 N. E. 324 (1929); Snyder v. Board of Park Commis-
sioners of Cleveland Metropolitan Park Dist., 125 Ohio St. 336, 181 N. E.
483 (1932). U. In re Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. 197 Wis. 503, 222
N. W. 776 (1929).
IKy. Stat. 2852.
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the power to fix rental rates and establish rules and regulations for
the operation of the projects. 1 Rule-making and rate-fixing are gen-
erally considered to be legislative functions in both England and
America." If this power is indeed legislative, a constitutional obstacle
arising from the doctrine of separation of powers is presented. It is a
well settled principle in the United States that the exercise of legis-
lative powers may not be delegated to other departments by the
legislature." In Kentucky, constitutional provisions expressly state
that no power of any department shall be exercised by either of the
other two departments," and that the legislative power shall be vested
in the General Assembly. While this doctrine of separation of powers
is a basic theory of American constitutional government, it is no longer
insisted upon as a hard and fast rule. The courts have long recognized
that the separation of powers is far from complete,2" and that the line
of demarcation between them is often indefinite." For these reasons,
as well as for the sake of expediting the administration of the laws, it
is an equally well settled principle in our law that the legislature may
delegate to boards or commissions functions which the legislature
'Ky. Stat. 2741x-7 provides: "Such Commission shall operate,
manage, and control low-cost housing projects in their entirety, fix the
rates of their rental, establish by-laws...."
",.Minister of Health v. Rex (on the Prosecution of Yaffe) (1931)
A. C. 494, in which Lord Thankerton, speaking of the rule-making
power expressly given the Minister of Health by the English Housing
Act of 1925, said at 532: "Parliament has delegated a legislative func-
tion to a minister of the crown"; Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants'
Elevator Co., 259 U. S. 285 (1932), in which Mr. Justice Brandeis said:
"To determine what rate, rule, or practice shall be deemed reasonable
for the future is a legislative function." Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line
Co., 211 U. S. 210, 53 L. Ed. 150 (1908) (proceedings to establish rates
are legislative); Southern Pacific Co. v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co., 101
Fed. 779 (1900); City of Pocatello v. Murray, 173 Fed. 382 (1909) (fix-
ing water rates by a city, when not a matter of contract, is a legislative
function); Oregon R. & Nay. Co. v. Campbell, 173 Fed. 957, 973 (1909)
(the function of fixing railroad rates is a "legislative function").
n Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224
U. S. 194, 56 L. Ed. 729, 32 S. Ct. 436 (1911); Merchant's Exchange
v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616, 111 S. W. 565 (1908); State v. Orange, 60
N. J. L. 111, 36 Atl. 706 (1897); People v. Klink Packing Co., 214 N. Y.
121, 108 N. E. 278 (1916); Klein v. Barry, 182 Wis. 255, 196 N. W. 457
(1923).
" Ky. Const., sec. 27, 28, and 29. Sec. 28 provides for certain
exceptions.
Murray v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272, 15 L. Ed. 372 (1855);
Oregon R. Co. v. Campbell, 173 Fea. 957 (1909).
' People v. Simon, 176 Ill. 165, 52 N. E. 910 (1898); Devine v.
Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 270 Ill. 504, 509, 110 N. E. 780 (1915)
in which the court said: ". . . in the practical administration of
state affairs, there is often such a blending and admixture of the dif-
ferent powers of government that instances will occur in which officers
are charged with functions and duties which partake of all three of
these departments."
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itself could ordinarily exercise.? Having enacted legislation which
sets up a definite standard, the legislature may delegate the power of
making rules and regulations to administrative bodies, the administra-
tive function consisting of filling in the details not embodied in the
necessarily general standard.? In Kentucky, the delegation of rule-
making and rate-fixing powers to boards or commissions is valid."
The Kentucky court sanctions the delegation of this power to fill in
the details, saying that they are "purely administrative" rather than
legislative.25
With the expanding social legislation in keeping with the need for
such enactments, neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the
maxim, delegata potestas non potest delegari, is strictly enforced. The
trend of the courts in the United States is indicated by the opinion of
Mr. Justice Holmes in Springer v. Government of the Philippine
Islandse where he said that the doctrine of separation of powers is not
intended "to divide the branches into water-tight compartments" but
rather to afford an essential working principle to be applied practically
in a practical world. PHLI ScHIF
CONFLICT OF LAWS-WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE VALIDITY
OF A CONTRACT IN KENTUCKY.
The American courts have adopted at least three different rules
in determining the law of what place should govern the validity of a
contract. The rules so adopted are: (1) That the law of the place of
"Marshall, C. J., in Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42 (1825)
said: "Congress may certainly delegate to others the powers which it
may rightfully exercise itself." Accord, Bay City First National Bank
v. Fellows, 244 U. S. 416, 61 L. Ed. 1233, 37 S. Ct. 734 (1917); People
v. Roth, 294 Ill. 532, 94 N. E. 953 (1911); State Racing Comm. v.
Latonia Agricultural Assn., 136 Ky. 173, 123 S. W. 681 (1909); State
Board of Charities & Corrections v. Hays, 190 Ky. 147, 227 S. W. 282
(1920); McKenny v. Farnsworth, 121 Me. 450, 118 Atl. 237 (1922);
Comm. v. Sisson, 189 Mass. 247, 75 N. E. 619; Village of Saratoga
Springs v. Saratoga Springs Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 191 N. Y.
123, 83 N. E. 693 (1908).
2 Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Springs Gas, Electric
Light & Power Co., szapra n. 22.2
1 L. & N. R. Co. v. Greenbrier Distillery Co., 170 Ky. 775, 187 S. W.
296 (1916); Hunter v. City of Louisville, 204 Ky. 562, 265 S. W. 277
(1924); Estes v. State Highway Comm., 235 Ky. 86, 29 S. W. (2d)
583 (1930).
2 Estes v. State Highway Comm., supra n. 24. See also Klein v.
City of Louisville, 224 Ky. 624, 6 S. W. (2d) 1104 (1928); Bell's Com-
mittee v. Board of Education of Harrodsburg, 192 Ky. 700, 234 S. W. 311
(1921); Lawrence County v. Lawrence County Fiscal Court, 191 Ky.
45, 229 S. W. 139 (1921).
20277 U. S. 189 at 211, 72 L. Ed. 853 at 855 (1928).
For a very recent case, decided after this note was written, and
bearing out the reasoning and contentions of the writer, see Knoxville
Housing Authority, Inc. v. City of Knoxville et al., - Tenn. -, 123
S. W. (2d) 1085 (1939) and cases cited therein.
